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In the past four years, rising world food prices and the global 
economic downturn increased the ranks of the world’s food 
insecure1  from  848  million  to  925  million  by  September 
2010, reversing decades of slow yet steady progress in reducing 
hunger (WFP and FAO 2010). While the human costs have 
been considerable, the political consequences have been signif-
icant as well. Food prices sparked demonstrations and riots 
1. The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing “when all 
people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a 
healthy and active life” (WHO 2010). Food insecurity exists when people do 
not have adequate physical, social or economic access to food as defined above 
(FAO 2010). 
in 48 countries 2007–08. While prices receded in 2009, they 
reached historic highs in February 2011—and were once again 
implicated in political turmoil. High food and fuel prices were 
among the grievances motivating the demonstrations that led 
to the ouster of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
These crises have fed concerns of two skeptical groups. For 
Neo-Malthusians, they are further evidence that food insecurity 
is the inevitable consequence of overpopulation and outstrip-
ping the world’s finite resources. For food sovereignty advo-
cates, the blame lays with the developing world’s dependence 
on international food markets. The solution, food sovereignty 
advocates argue, is to move toward national food self-sufficiency 
programs, as a matter of both human and national security.
This brief assesses the claims of these two groups. The 
Neo-Malthusian  position  is  overblown.  Population  growth 
and  economic  development  contribute  somewhat  to  price 
increases, but there are few structural, resource-based impedi-
ments  to  increasing  aggregate  agricultural  production.  The 
biggest near-term threats to food security are not dwindling 
agricultural  inputs  and  agricultural  trade,  but  rather  the 
familiar problems of poverty and political barriers to market 
access—in particular, the distortions created by agricultural 
policy in the United States and European Union. A robust 
trading system is the best way to address current food security 
problems. In light of forecast changes in global patterns of 
agricultural productivity, a robust trading system will become 
even more important to ensuring that a world undergoing 
climate change will be able to feed itself.
Rising WoRld Food PRices and PRice 
Volatility
Though only 15 percent of world food production is traded on 
international markets, prices for the remaining 85 percent—
which circulates in local, regional, and national markets—are 
increasingly aligned with world prices. Significant price pass-
through to domestic markets occurs even in heavily subsidized 
markets like the European Union (Ferrucci, Jiménez-Rodríguez N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 2   j u l y   2 0 1 1
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and Onorante 2010) and North Korea, the most autarkic food 
market in the world (Haggard and Noland 2007). 
Following a 20-year period of stability and relatively low 
prices in world food markets, price increases and price vola-
tility marked the 2000s, particularly the period from 2007 to 
the  present.  Both  the  United  Nations  Conference  on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the Food and Agricultural 
Organization  (FAO)  food  price  indices  set  record  highs  in 
February 2011, eclipsing the previous highs that were set in 
April 2008 (see figure 1).
Not only are prices up, but volatility is as well: during 2007–
10, mean volatility in both indices was more than double that of 
2000–07. Volatility in rice, the world’s most widely consumed 
staple,  has  nearly  tripled  (although  world  markets  are  thin). 
Volatility in both wheat and soybean oil has roughly doubled.
Near-term  forecasts  do  not  suggest  a  prompt  return  to 
price normalcy. Recent projections by a host of organizations, 
including the FAO, the US Department of Agriculture, and the 
European Commission’s Department of Agricultural and Rural 
Development,  all  point  to  higher  than  normal  agricultural 
commodity prices and continued price volatility (FAO, 2010, 
USDA, 2011, COM, 2011). The sense that a sea change has 
occurred in food markets is pervasive. The question is why.
Malthus Reconsidered: Demographics and Dwindling 
Natural Resources
One common argument is that too many mouths are chasing 
too few calories, and that our capacity to meet our food needs 
is  bumping  up  against  significant  structural  constraints. 
Neo-Malthusians contend that and levels population growth, 
along with increasing affluence and per capita levels of food 
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Figure 1     World food prices, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Food and Agriculture    
                      Organization (FAO), 1960–2011
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consumption causing exponentially increasing demands on our 
natural resources. As the resource base dwindles, increases in 
food production will not keep pace with increases in popula-
tion, leading inexorably to shortages, land and water degrada-
tion,  distributional  conflicts,  and  widespread,  chronic  food 
insecurity.
Neo-Malthusians  like  Paul  Ehrlich,  author  of  1968’s 
Population  Bomb,  and  the  Club  of  Rome,  which  published 
Limits to Growth in 1972, looked remarkably prescient in the 
1970s,  publishing  their  works  just  years  before  world  food 
prices skyrocketed and remained both high and extremely vola-
tile for a decade, largely due to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 
and the entrance of the Soviet Union as a major purchaser in 
world markets. 
Aside from price spikes in 1988–89 and 1996, however, 
the next two decades were characterized by falling prices and 
gains in eradicating world hunger.
Following  the  2007–08  price  spike,  Neo-Malthusian 
worries returned to the forefront, in the pages of the Wall Street 
Journal2, in major academic and popular press books3, and in 
Foreign Affairs (“Against the Grain,” January/February, 2010).4 
Jeffrey Sachs, of Columbia University’s Earth Institute, argued 
that Malthus might have been right, at least with respect to 
Africa.5 As prices ramped up in the summer of 2007, Niall 
Ferguson, the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard 
University and William Ziegler Professor at Harvard Business 
School, wrote in the Los Angeles Times that “a new era of dearth, 
misery and its old companion, vice, are set to make a mighty 
Malthusian comeback.”6
There has been a clear upward linear trend in world food 
prices over the last half-century. Expanding populations and 
economic development in emerging economies have no doubt 
increased demand, especially since 1990. But are higher prices 
and increased volatility since 2000, especially the recurrent price 
spikes, due to growing populations and increasing affluence? 
The  answer  is  yes—but  only  in  part.  These  long  run, 
structural  processes  were  well  underway  during  the  1990s, 
2. Justin Lahart, Patrick Barta and Andrew Batson, “New Limits to Growth 
Revive Malthusian Fears,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2008.
3. Julian Cribb, The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and What We 
Can Do to Avoid It. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. Thom 
Hartmann, Threshold: The Crisis of Western Culture. New York: Penguin Books, 
2009. Paul Roberts, 2008. The End of Food. New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt. 
4. Carlisle Ford Runge and Carlisle Piehl Runge, “Against the Grain,” Foreign 
Affairs 89(1): 8-14.
5. Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Are Malthus’s Predicted 1798 Food Shortages Coming 
True?” Scientific American, August 25, 2008.
6. Niall Ferguson, “Don’t Count Out Malthus,” Los Angeles Times, July 30, 
2007.
a decade during which world food prices fell and volatility 
was low. China grew just as fast during the 1990s as it did 
in 2000s, and India grew only marginally faster (7 percent 
versus 5.5 percent annually, on average). Global consumption 
of wheat, maize and rice grew at 0.8, 1.0 and 2.1 percent per 
year from 2000–07, but grew at 1.4, 1.4, and 2.6 percent from 
1995–2000.  Changing  patterns  of  demand  in  fast-growing 
developing economies—in particular, rising demand for beef, 
which requires more grain to be used as feed—may be part of 
the story, but again, these changes were well underway in the 
1990s. The main effect of the increase in demand has been to 
decrease world stockpiles, which were at record highs in the 
late 1990s but dwindled until 2009–10. Stockpiles are crucial 
to mitigating price shocks for relatively price-inelastic goods, 
such as basic foodstuffs. As Figure 2 demonstrates, there has 
been zero aggregate growth in land under cereal grain cultiva-
tion since 1990; all increases in grain availability have been 
due to increasing yields: growing more food per cultivated 
hectare. As the rate of yield increase has slowed while demand 
has increased in recent decades, stockpiles have fallen.
While this story is intuitive, it begs the question of why 
markets  have  not  adjusted  by  increasing  production,  either 
through increases in yields or land under cultivation. Population 
growth and economic development are structural, slow-moving 
variables. Generally speaking, it is hard to explain price shocks 
and excessive volatility with factors that are easily anticipated by 
markets. No one was surprised that the world added 77 million 
people between 2006 and 2007, and China and India, the two 
emerging  economies  whose  growing  affluence  is  most  often 
cited as the cause of structural increases in demand, grew at 
rates entirely consistent with their recent performance. 
Total food production in both real and per capita terms 
has increased significantly since 2000, even as real prices have 
risen. World population has increased by 12.7 percent, but 
world cereal production has increased by almost 20 percent, 
and meat production by 23 percent. World cereals and meat 
production per capita were higher in 2008, the worst year of 
the previous crisis, than at any point in past 50 years. The world 
has grown steadily more populous and wealthier, but food 
production has increased as well. And while changing dietary 
patterns are pushing up aggregate demand for food—more 
consumption of meat, which requires considerable expansion 
of feed grain production—the simple Neo-Malthusian notion, 
that aggregate need is outstripping aggregate supply, is wrong.
The main effect of the increase in demand 
has been to decrease world stockpilesN u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 2   j u l y   2 0 1 1
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A  corollary  to  the  carrying-capacity  argument  is  that 
while current rates of growth in the food supply are suffi-
cient to keep up with increasing demand, we will soon run 
up against significant resource constraints that make current 
modes of agriculture fundamentally unsustainable. These argu-
ments revolve around constraints on four major inputs: arable 
land, water, oil, and fertilizers. Of the four, a lack of arable land 
is  least  compelling.  A  2009  joint  OECD-FAO  report  finds 
that currently available cropland could be more than doubled 
by  adding  1.56  billion  hectares  of  cultivable  land  without 
encroaching on forests and protected areas or limiting urban 
expansion (OECD-FAO 2009).7 Unfortunately, most of it is 
located in regions—Sub-Saharan Africa and South America—
that face producer disincentives arising from US and EU agri-
cultural  policies,  and  would  require  higher  world  prices,  or 
subsidies, in order to induce necessary investment.
Peak  water  (Gleick  and  Palaniappan  2010),  peak  oil 
(Deffeyes 2008, Pfeiffer 2006) and peak phosphate (Cordell, 
Drangert and White 2009, Elser and White 2010) advocates 
contend  that  modern  agricultural  production  is  dependent 
7. Though the report acknowledges that doing so would require intense use of 
other inputs, principally freshwater.
on the use of non-renewable inputs, which by definition will 
eventually be depleted. Price increases will accelerate once peak 
production—the  maximum  rate  of  extraction—is  reached 
and the resource enters a terminal decline in productivity and 
recovery costs begin to increase. Peak arguments must be right 
in the most general sense: oil, phosphate, and potassium are all 
nonrenewable resources, and as such are finite.8 The question is 
whether the arguments are right on geological or human time 
scales.
While  freshwater  resources  are  globally  abundant  and 
renewable, peak water advocates argue that localized scarcity 
is a significant concern, particularly in the arid and semi-arid 
regions  that  are  dependent  on  groundwater  aquifers.  These 
sources are technically renewable but can be depleted (Gleick 
and Palaniappan 2010). More than ten percent of world agri-
culture depends on groundwater-sourced irrigation, including 
several major grain producing areas such as Punjab and the 
North China plain (FAO 2003a). In order for global agricul-
tural production to keep pace with population and demand 
8. Groundwater does not properly belong in this category, as recharge rates 
for groundwater are highly variable, ranging from very high in wetlands to 
virtually zero in arid climates.
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growth, this figure will likely have to increase. However, the 
1.6 billion additional hectares of potential arable land identified 
by the OECD-FAO study would not be heavily dependent on 
groundwater.
There is no doubt that rising oil prices have contributed 
to recent food price increases. Agricultural commodity prices 
increase 0.17 percent for every one percent increase in oil prices; 
USDA estimates that a doubling of costs in energy-intensive 
products—mostly  fuel,  but  fertilizers  to  a  lesser  extent—
increased export prices of corn, wheat, and soybean by 15–20 
percent  from  2002–07  (Baffes  2007,  Mitchell  2008).  These 
cost increases are smaller than those estimated for diversion of 
food grains into biofuel production. Energy costs are part of 
the story, and movement away from fossil fuel dependence is 
a laudable goal, but the current food-price situation cannot be 
blamed entirely (or even mostly) on higher energy costs.
Finally, others are concerned about major non-renewable 
and non-substitutable fertilizer inputs—principally phosphate. 
A  recent  article  in  Global  Environmental  Change  placed  the 
timing of peak world phosphate production at 2033 (Cordell, 
Drangert and White 2009). However, this estimate was based 
on  world  reserves  of  16  billion  metric  tons  (mt);  the  2011 
US Geological Survey Rock Phosphate world reserve estimate 
was revised to 65 billion mt. Assuming peak methodology is 
applicable  to  phosphate  production,  this  pushes  the  “peak” 
year of production back at least fifty years, to 2090, at which 
time annual rock phosphate production would be have to be 
456 million mt—nearly two and half times total production 
in 2010 (176.5 million) (USGS 2011a). To reach peak in that 
year, annual production would have to grow at an average rate 
of 1% for the next 72 years, almost double the average rate of 
growth in the past twenty years (0.54 percent). Potash reserves 
tell a similar story: peak production, given current reserve esti-
mates, will occur in 2076 at 59 million mt. To reach peak in 
that year, annual production would have to grow at an average 
rate of 0.8 percent for the next 65 years, only half the average 
rate of growth in the past twenty years. 
While we can ill-afford to be sanguine about depleting any 
non-renewable resources, the application of peak methodology 
to phosphate and potash is problematic. On theoretical and 
empirical grounds, peak methodology has been demonstrated 
to  produce  unstable  peak  production  and  reserve  estimates, 
especially  when  applied  to  less  comprehensively  surveyed 
resources like rock phosphate (Hendrix 2011, Giraud 2011). 
The most basic reason is that peak production estimates are 
dependent on present reserve estimates, but survey effort, and 
thus reserve estimates, are highly price-elastic. Until 2007–08, 
when  food  prices  drove  up  demand  for  agricultural  inputs, 
prices for rock phosphate and potash had been falling for thirty 
years. Higher prices spurred both survey effort, i.e., the search 
for new concentrations of valuable minerals, and the conver-
sion of known geologic resources—mineral concentrations that 
have been sampled and surveyed—to reserves, the extraction of 
which is economically feasible given prevailing technology and 
market prices. The result has been much higher reserves esti-
mates. By comparative standards, survey effort is still relatively 
low. Barclays Capital estimates that the energy industry will 
spend $490 billion on oil and natural gas exploration globally 
against world oil production valued at $2.5 trillion in 20109; 
industry-wide  spending  on  rock  phosphate  exploration,  in 
contrast, was $2.6 million against $21.6 billion in FY 2010–11. 
Regarding  potash,  9.5  billion  mt  are  currently  classified  as 
reserves, but 250 billion more are classified as resources (USGS 
2011b). Aggregate availability of key fertilizer inputs does not 
rank highly in terms of present causes for concern.
Moreover, increasing fertilizer input prices have not been a 
large contributor to food price levels or volatility. Fertilizer input 
price pass-throughs to food, even for input-intensive crops, such 
as US maize, are low: a $100/mt price increase of diammonium 
phosphate  (DAP),  the  main  phosphate-based  fertilizer,  only 
increases  maize  prices  by  $0.79/mt.  Potash  ($1.18/mt)  and 
urea ($3.54/mt) have similar price pass-through levels.10 At the 
then-historic high price levels for DAP reached in 2008, DAP 
still only accounted for 9.3% of corn production costs. Rising 
fertilizer costs have had small impacts on crop prices, even as 
prices for both have risen. Rather, rising energy prices have been 
driving both (Baffes 2009).
the alluRe (and illusion) oF national 
selF-suFFiciency
While  some  point  the  finger  at  demographic  patterns  and 
depleted resource bases, others lay blame on the international 
trading system. Following the events of 2007–08 and in the 
midst of the current crisis, the food sovereignty movement 
has  gained  significant  steam.  Proponents  of  national  food 
sovereignty  movements  generally  favor  agricultural  policies 
that promote domestic production as an alternative to reliance 
on food imports. Especially in times of crisis, such as war or 
surging prices on global markets, food sovereignty holds the 
allure of insulating domestic consumers and producers from 
wild fluctuations in prices.
Beginning  with  the  Agricultural  Act  of  1949  in  the 
United  States  and  the  Treaty  of  Rome  in  the  European 
9. “Oil Industry Set for Record Exploration Spending in 2011,” Voice of 
America, December 29, 2010.
10. Elasticities were estimated by PotashCorp, based on USDA estimates. 
PotashCorp, “Why fertilizer?” 2009.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 2   j u l y   2 0 1 1
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Union, enhancing food self-sufficiency through programs of 
domestic subsidies has been a goal of agricultural policy in the 
developed world. Japan’s agricultural markets are character-
ized by even more massive distortions. In spite of significant 
pressure during the Doha round of WTO negotiations, the 
United States and European Union have been reticent to back 
away from significant domestic support for agriculture, and 
Japanese liberalization has been glacial. In the midst of the 
2007–08 crisis, Michel Barnier, current EU Commissioner 
for Internal Market and Services and then French Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, defended the EU’s policy on food 
self-sufficiency, arguing, “Food is not televisions or cars. You 
can’t leave all that to the laws of the market.”11
While  food  sovereignty—or  reducing  import  depen-
dency, at least—has been on the agenda in the United States 
and Europe for decades, it is back in vogue in the developing 
world. In 1960, developing countries ran food trade surpluses 
totaling $1 billion; by the beginning of the 21st century, defi-
cits were the norm and 48 of 63 low income countries, and 45 
of the 46 least developed countries, were net food importers. 
Speaking this year at the World Social Forum in Dakar, former 
Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said that African 
nations should pursue a “green revolution” and move toward 
food  self-sufficiency,  noting,  “There  can  be  no  sovereignty 
without food sovereignty.”12 
During the price spike of 2007–08, over 85 percent of the 
105 emerging and developing countries surveyed by the World 
Bank  had  taken  some  policy  measures  to  reduce  the  trans-
mission of world food prices to domestic consumers. While 
these  measures  included  a  reduction  of  import  restrictions, 
they also included releasing food from reserves, price controls 
and consumer subsidies, direct cash transfers, food-for-work 
programs, food rations or stamps, and export restrictions, some 
of which, particularly export restrictions, have large market-
distorting effects (FAO 2008, World Bank 2008, 2009).
Acute crises often call for extensive market interventions. 
In the aftermath of these crises, however, renewed emphasis 
has been placed on food sovereignty or food self-sufficiency 
as a durable policy goal by many developing countries. Even 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, two arid countries with extremely 
limited access to renewable water, announced plans to become 
food self-sufficient through a mixture of increasing domestic 
production  and  leasing  farmland  abroad.  Qatar  plans  to 
increase  cultivated  land  by  over  140  percent  in  the  next 
11. Simon Taylor, “If the CAP fits, the EU will grow,” European Voice, January 
31, 2008. 
12. Drew Hinshaw, “Africa Needs “Green Revolution” to Buffer Food Prices, 
Lula Says,” Bloomberg Businessweek Online, February 7, 2011.
decade using water from solar-powered desalinization plants.13 
Olivier de Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, recently called on the G20 to help developing countries 
reverse dependence on food imports via producer subsidies 
and protected markets.14 
There is some evidence that agricultural protectionism 
is rising. Since 2007, global average import tariffs on maize, 
the main staple in much of Latin American and Africa, have 
increased by 68 percent, while the percentage of duty free 
maize imports has dropped by over a third (see figure 3). Tariffs 
for wheat, however, have seen secular declines throughout the 
period.
More  damaging,  however,  has  been  the  imposition  of 
export  bans.  Of  the  top  five  food-exporting  emerging  and 
developing countries (Brazil, China, Argentina, Thailand and 
Indonesia), only Thailand and Brazil did not further exacer-
bate the 2007–08 crisis by imposing export restrictions (FAO 
2008). Export restrictions may have contributed as much as 
35 percent to world rice prices and 25 percent to wheat prices 
during the crisis (Martin and Anderson, 2010).
Export restrictions increase domestic food supplies, but 
impose a variety of losses: in the domestic arena, producers 
do not get accurate demand signals, nor do they benefit from 
higher prices. This distorts incentives to invest in expanding 
productive  capacity,  which  is  necessary  to  increase  supply 
in  the  long  run.  These  restrictions  are  a  crude  means  of 
addressing acute food insecurity, as they subsidize consump-
tion by comparatively well-off households, rather than just 
by the poor. Moreover, export restrictions are classic beggar-
thy-neighbor policies, throwing costs of adjustment back onto 
international markets.
While export bans flew in the face of long-run economic 
logic and specific World Bank policy recommendations, doing 
so  earned  political  dividends.  China,  India,  and  Indonesia 
enacted export restrictions that were largely successful in insu-
lating domestic markets from international price pressures. 
Incumbent governments in India and Indonesia were both 
reelected in 2009, partly on the basis of their success in stabi-
lizing food prices (Timmer 2010, FAO 2009). In Russia, both 
the president and prime minister’s approval ratings improved 
following the August 2010 announcement of an export ban 
on wheat, meslin, barley and rye.15 
In  the  absence  of  major  reform  to  subsidy  policies  in 
13. Andrew England, “Qatar gets taste for food self-sufficiency,” Financial 
Times, June 29, 2010. 
14. Olivier de Schutter, “Food Crises: G20 needs Architects, not Firefighters,” 
Project Syndicate, January 28, 2011.
15. “Medvedev, Putin’s approval ratings go up after wildfires—polls,” RIA 
Novosti, September 3, 2010.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 2   j u l y   2 0 1 1
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developed  countries,  market  protectionism  and/or  higher 
prices will be necessary for developing countries to achieve 
food sovereignty. Some countries, such as Malawi and Zambia, 
have  transitioned  from  grain  importers  to  grain  exporters 
on  the  basis  of  successful,  though  controversial,  subsidy 
programs. The costs of these subsidy programs are quite high, 
amounting  to  more  than  60  percent  of  their  agricultural 
budgets, which crowds out needed investment in agricultural 
research and road networks (IRIN 2008). While these poli-
cies seem prescient in times of high food prices, it remains to 
be seen whether Malawi and Zambia will be able to sustain 
these subsidy programs at lower food prices, as the political 
realities of producer subsidies make them extremely difficult 
to remove. 
There are other problems that could arise from the pursuit 
of  self-sufficiency.  First,  modern  food  production  relies  on 
inputs  that  are  sourced  from  global  markets.  Closing  off  
markets to food imports risks provoking retaliatory restrictions 
on inputs for which, in many countries, no domestic sources 
are available: 16 countries produce 95 percent of the world’s 
phosphate (Morocco and Western Sahara hold over 75 percent 
of currently estimated world reserves); 13 countries produce 
virtually all of the world’s potash. However, the most famous 
examples  of  self-imposed  fertilizer  export  embargoes—the   
US  ban  on  phosphate  shipments  to  the  Soviet  Union  in 
1980 and the German potash embargo during World War 
I—occurred in radically different international environments 
than  that  which  obtains  currently:  the  United  States  was 
punishing its chief rival for the invasion of Afghanistan, while 
Germany was at war with its neighbors and trading partners. 
Today, most of the major input exporters are WTO members 
or observers.
Second, under the food sovereignty system, international 
markets for basic foodstuffs would become even thinner, as 
incentives to produce tradable agricultural surpluses in any 
given country would diminish. Autarky is an inherently risky 
proposition,  and  this  risk  increases  proportionally  with  the 
number of other countries pursuing the same policies. These 
risks are poorly understood, as they stem not just from natural 
variability in food yields but also from the more general failure 
to reap gains from trade.
If a single food autarkic country has a poor harvest, there 
is implicit (though not costless) insurance against hunger via 
international  markets  and  the  ability  to  import.  However, 
autarky reduces both imports and exports, which diminishes 
capacity to earn the foreign exchange necessary for accessing 
world markets. A truly food sovereign world would trade risks 
that  stem  from  price  volatility  on  international  markets  for 
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Figure 3     Average tariffs on Maize imports, 2005–10
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risks that stem from self-insurance. Domestic grain reserves are 
a potential source of stability, but their cost can be significant 
(15–20 percent of the value of the stock per year (Lin 2008)), 
and extended periods of drought and/or successive crop failures 
can tax the limits of a country to self-insure in times of stress.
Third, food sovereignty, whatever its theoretical merits, is 
not a practical policy goal for many countries under most-likely 
climate change scenarios, at least with present levels of tech-
nology. The forecast future effects of climate change are discon-
certing  for  global  food  production.  The  Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) forecasts dramatic decreases 
(>20 percent) in rainfall across broad swaths of North Africa 
and  the  Middle  East,  Meso-  and  Central  America  and  the 
Caribbean, Southern Africa, the eastern Amazon basin, and 
Western Australia, leading to an average decrease in the avail-
ability of water of 10–30 percent (IPCC 2007). In addition, 
dramatic rainfall increases (>20 percent) are forecast for the 
higher latitudes of the Northern hemisphere and the Horn of 
Africa (IPCC 2007). 
The IPCC also forecasts a 90 percent likelihood that vari-
ability in rainfall will increase, leading to more numerous heat 
waves and dry spells and heavy precipitation events and flooding. 
An increase in areas affected by drought is viewed as likely, as is 
the forecast that future tropical cyclones, such as hurricanes and 
typhoons, will become more intense and destructive. Moreover, 
the IPCC forecasts a similar likelihood of an increase in extreme 
sea level events, such as storm surges and abnormally high tides 
that will inundate coastal areas.
Climate change will affect global food production in two 
important  ways.  First,  climate  change  will  affect  both  how 
much food is grown and where it is grown. Second, climate 
change  will  increase  the  frequency  of  localized  crop  failures 
due to more frequent extreme weather events such as droughts, 
flooding, extended cold and heat waves, and cyclonic storms 
(IPCC 2007). The first mechanism challenges the broad feasi-
bility  of  food  sovereignty  for  much  of  the  globe,  while  the 
second highlights the dangers of a world food system in which 
production is highly geographically concentrated.
In  the  aggregate,  global  output  potential  is  forecast  to 
decrease by between 6 and 18 percent in areas currently under 
cultivation  by  the  2080s,  depending  on  the  rate  at  which 
atmospheric  carbon  stimulates  plant  growth  (Cline  2007). 
However,  these  aggregate  effects  mask  dramatic  regional 
inequalities in agricultural production potential (see table 1). 
Some major exporting countries at higher latitudes, particularly 
the United States, Canada, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Russia, 
and Ukraine, are forecast to increase agricultural yields. Yields 
in many tropical developing countries, including major rice 
exporters Thailand, India, and Vietnam, are forecast to decline, 
in some cases by up to 38 percent (Cline 2007). Overall, non-
European developing countries are forecast to experience yield 
loses between 9 percent and 21 percent.
While expanding area under cultivation will offset some 
of  these  productivity  losses,  many  countries,  especially  in 
Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, face significant land 
constraints. India, projected to be the world’s most populous 
country by 2030, already uses over 80 percent of its cultivable 
land; Egypt, Iran and Turkey use over 100 percent, indicating 
that  farming  is  only  sustainable  through  irrigation,  which 
requires significant investment in rural infrastructure.
Extreme  weather  events  always  present  significant  chal-
lenges for local production and livelihoods, but these localized 
weather events can have global consequences when they strike 
in major food-exporting countries and regions. Historic high 
temperatures and wildfires in Russia and the Ukraine destroyed 
crops in 28 regions, causing their 2010 grain harvest to drop 
by a third, spurring export bans and roiling world markets.16 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Moldova had joined their neighbors in banning wheat exports. 
Drought in Australia and heat waves in California’s San Joaquin 
Valley  were  further  implicated  in  the  2007–08  price  spike 
(Mittal 2009). 
Climate change thus presents two problems that suggest 
diametrically  opposed  solutions.  Greater  concentration  of 
production in countries with favorable climatic conditions and 
a robust trading system will be necessary for the world to feed 
itself. At the same time, erratic climatic patterns mean that 
geographic concentration of production poses significant risks, 
and these risks are forecast to increase substantially.
Politics, RatheR than Malthus oR 
MaRkets
There is a potential disconnect between the two food securi-
ties:  food  security  as  a  component  of  human  security  (the 
most conventional definition, used by health organizations 
16. Dmitry Zaks, “Russia may extend grain export ban: minister,” Agence 
France Presse, February 22, 2011.
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and NGOs), and food security as a component of national 
security, national economic interests, and domestic political 
power. From the national interest perspective, market inter-
ventions are a key component of food security because they 
generate  powerful  constituencies  that  provide  leaders  with 
consistent bases of political support.
Nowhere is this clearer than in US and EU ethanol policy. 
US ethanol subsidies were $7.7 billion in 2009, and the US 
ethanol industry consumed 40 percent of United States corn 
production.  Globally,  biofuel  production  consumed  6% 
of  world  cereals  production  (International  Grains  Council 
2010). A World Bank research working paper estimates that 
biofuel production contributed more to the 2007–08 crisis 
than the weak dollar (which stimulates purchasing in markets 
with relatively stronger currencies), rising fuel costs, and rapid 
growth in China and India (Mitchell 2008).
Though initially driven by the goal of reducing the depen-
dence on fossil fuels, ethanol now has its own political logic, 
which  funnels  benefits  to  ethanol  producers  in  politically 
important Midwestern states. In particular, Iowa’s position as 
the first step in the nominations for US presidential candi-
dates makes stated support for ethanol a virtual prerequisite 
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Table 1     Arable land availability and forecast productivity gains/ 
  losses due to climate change
Region/Country
Current percentage 
of Arable Land under 
cultivation,
FAO estimatesa
Percent of productivity 
loss/gain due to climate 
change,
2070–99b











Russian Federation 46.8 6.2








South and Central America 13.9 –12.9
Argentina 30.0 2.2
Brazil 9.2 –4.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 14.2 –16.6





b. Cline 2007, with additional calculations by author. Calculations based on estimates assuming gains from 
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for the US presidency. As such, ethanol subsidies are politically 
rational but come with large externalities: biofuels pushed up 
the prices on food, both directly on resources used for energy, 
such as maize and vegetable oil, and indirectly because of substi-
tutions in production or consumption. 
Understanding  this  disconnect  is  key  to  understanding 
how market interventions, designed to preserve the latter “food 
security”, have been perhaps the most persistent threat to the 
former type of food security. 
These discussions also conflate acute and chronic food inse-
curity. Chronic food insecurity is a persistent lack of “sufficient, 
safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life,” and is 
generally caused by extreme poverty (WHO 2010). Acute food 
insecurity refers to temporary gaps in access to the same, and 
may be caused by a variety of factors ranging from high prices 
to breakdowns in delivery systems, economic recessions, natural 
disasters, and extreme weather events, political turmoil, volatile 
derivative markets, and conflict itself. The recent food price 
spikes have led to widespread acute food insecurity. But most of 
the policy measures directed at shielding consumers from rising 
prices  are  not  geared  toward  addressing  more  fundamental 
causes of chronic food insecurity. These would include poverty, 
lack of market access, and high levels of subsistence agriculture 
coinciding with environmental degradation and marginal lands. 
Market  interventions,  particularly  farm  subsidies,  have 
been massively successful at increasing food production in a 
few select cases. The European Union, United States, and Japan 
account for 91 percent of all domestic subsidy expenditures 
by WTO members, while the EU alone accounts for almost 
90 percent of export subsidies (Schnepf 2005). Though the 
prevailing conventional wisdom is that the removal of subsi-
dies in developed countries will provide broad benefits for the 
developing world, the food security logic of developed country 
subsidy policies is complex, as their removal would have both 
long-term and short-term effects. In the long term, removing 
agricultural subsidies would likely have a modest effect on world 
prices and would raise incomes in the developing world—but 
most of the benefits would accrue to large net exporters of 
agricultural products, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Thailand 
(Birdsall, Rodrik and Subramanian 2005).
However,  the  short-term  effects  are  more  ambiguous. 
While  developed  country  subsidies  distort  incentives  for 
developing  country  producers  and  increase  food  prices  for 
domestic consumers, they also keep food prices artificially low 
in world markets. Thus, developed country subsidies increase 
aggregate  food  production,  and  subsidize  consumption  in 
developing countries while decreasing economic access to food, 
via suppressed incomes, in more rural areas. Policymakers in 
developing countries thus face a dilemma: in order to induce 
investment in agricultural production and promote economic 
development,  prices  need  to  be  higher.  But  higher  prices 
decrease urban real incomes, fuel grievances, erode support for 
governments, and lead in some cases to political turmoil. 
As  Nancy  Birdsall  and  Arvind  Subramanian  point  out, 
the  current  situation  is  the  “worst  of  all  possible  worlds.”17 
When markets are stable and prices low, we have huge market 
distortions  that  subsidize  urban  consumption  in  the  devel-
oping world at the expense of taxpayers in wealthy countries 
and the rural poor, which does little to alleviate poverty, the 
root cause of chronic food insecurity. In times of crisis, markets 
for food break down as countries institute export restrictions, 
further exacerbating the problem and contributing to greater 
acute food insecurity. Achieving price stability and adequate 
supplies in times of high prices is thus a classic collective action 
problem: all governments theoretically benefit from relatively 
open markets, yet face domestic incentives to curtail market 
access. If food-importing countries believe that markets will not 
provide stable access to food, pressures to pursue problematic 
food sovereignty programs will no doubt rise.
The same can be said for maintaining adequate stockpiles. 
Food is not a market that should clear; there is a significant 
global  public  good  that  arises  from  adequate  stocks,  which 
cushion  consumption  against  short-term  supply  shocks  and 
dampen prices and price volatility. Yet maintaining food stocks 
is a costly enterprise for any country due to stock deterioration, 
and  globalization  may  have  caused  policymakers  to  become 
overly optimistic about relying on this implicit source of insur-
ance without creating new mechanisms to ensure an adequate 
reserve. The ad hoc policies in this area have harmed more than 
helped. The largest increases in grain stocks from 2010–11, 
such as those in Ukraine and Russia, were achieved through 
export bans and came at the cost of higher world prices.
What’s to be done
The most pressing challenges to current food security, and 
providing food security for future generations, are political 
and economic, rather than Malthusian. Moreover, some can 
17. Nancy Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, “Food and Free Trade,” Wall 
Street Journal Asia, April 25, 2008.
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be addressed in the short term, while others will take longer. 
Some solutions can be implemented unilaterally, while others 
will require international cooperation.
US and EU biofuel mandates divert needed grains from 
stomachs and stockpiles into gas tanks, and they do so inef-
ficiently. Moreover, steep import tariffs on Brazilian sugar-based 
ethanol, which is much more bio-energetically and economi-
cally efficient to produce, require US consumers and taxpayers 
to  trade  off  higher  food  prices  against  reduced  dependence 
on foreign petroleum when no such tradeoff need be made. 
Currently, imported ethanol faces a 2.5 percent ad valorem duty 
in addition to a $0.54 per gallon surcharge, which is greater 
than the $0.45 per gallon tax credit under Volumetric Ethanol 
Excise Tax Credit (VEETC), or “blender’s credit,” that is the 
backbone of US ethanol policy. The import tariffs, surcharges, 
and VEETC are set to expire at the end of 2011, and should be 
allowed to do so. The domestic politics of doing so, however, 
are bound to be arduous, meaning that corn subsidies in some 
form are likely to stay. The US electorate’s taste for the blender’s 
credit, however, may be on the wane. On June 16, the Senate 
voted 73-27 to end the blender’s credit, and though the amend-
ment is unlikely to pass the House of Representatives for reasons 
both political and constitutional (tax bills must originate in the 
lower house), it should be taken as a positive sign.
If the US government and US taxpayers wish to subsidize 
corn production, it is better that said subsidy has the positive 
externality of generating consumable surpluses rather than the 
negative externality crowding out food production and causing 
higher  food  prices.  Chief  among  the  charms  of  this  policy 
lever is the fact that it is one of the few things that the US 
government could do unilaterally to help bring down world 
food prices. Technology subsidies would be better put to use 
developing 2nd generation biofuels, which would mitigate the 
carbon footprint and land-use changes to an even greater extent 
than comparatively efficient—but still far from ideal—sugar- 
and rapeseed-based ethanol.
Also in the near term, the international community must 
act collectively to address export bans, which are individually 
rational but impose massive costs on the entire system. Article 
XI of the GATT allows for temporary quantitative export restric-
tions in order to “ … prevent or relieve critical shortages of food-
stuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting 
party,” and generally require WTO members to consult with 
and assess the potential effects on food-importing members, 
though this restriction only applies to developing countries that 
are net exporters of the commodity being restricted. This policy 
is toothless, as the disciplines are extremely vague. 
In light of the domestic political and social benefits export 
bans can confer, there must be some sort of grand bargain that 
can ensure that export restrictions go the way of import restric-
tions, which had been on a downward trend until 2007. One 
possible  solution  would  be  to  replace  producer  subsidies  in 
developed countries with disavowal of export restrictions—or 
at the least, integrating food trade more fully into the WTO’s 
dispute  settlement  mechanisms,  which  would  allow  WTO 
members to impose retaliatory tariffs. Current proposals before 
the G20, and in the Doha round, fall well short of this magni-
tude of policy change. However, there is a mismatch between 
the costs and benefits of this trade. The costs would be borne 
primarily by agricultural producers in developed countries and 
incumbent politicians in food-exporting developing countries, 
while the primary direct beneficiaries would be producers in 
middle-income  countries  and  urban  consumers  in  import-
dependent developing countries. The United States, as both a 
major food exporter that has resorted to export bans in the past 
(export bans on wheat in 1979) and a key provider of producer 
subsidies, will need to be the linchpin of any such negotiations. 
Finally, the near-term must see renewed investment in 
organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP), which 
addresses acute food insecurity, particularly in conflict- and 
famine-affected areas. In the midst of the last crisis, the inter-
national  community  responded  by  nearly  doubling  contri-
butions  to  the  WFP;  as  the  current  crisis  began  in  2010, 
contributions  fell  in  real  terms  (see  figure  4).  Considering 
the relatively small dollar amounts involved, receding from 
commitments to providing safety nets to those in most dire 
need is inexcusable. Yet this is precisely what is happening. 
The  US  budget  deal,  which  averted  a  general  government 
shutdown on April 8, saw net cuts to US foreign food assis-
tance: US FY 2011 spending on foreign food assistance was 
pared back to FY 2010 levels; some $273 million less than 
requested by the Obama Administration.
The only long-term solution to achieving price normalcy is 
to increase growth in production faster than growth in demand, 
which would allow buffer stocks to return to adequate levels. 
Doing so can only be achieved with some mixture of increasing 
yields and increasing land under cultivation. Yet this will require 
some subversion of the price mechanism in order to achieve 
necessary increases in output without causing acute food inse-
curity. Grain producers responded to surging prices in 2007–08 
with the largest two-year increase in area under cultivation (4.5 
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percent) in over forty years, leading to lower prices in 2009 
and the largest global stockpiles since 2003. The price increase 
necessary to incentivize such a change, however, had a heavy 
human and political toll. Moreover, generating large stockpiles 
is individually irrational, even as these stockpiles are needed to 
buffer against rapid price increases.
Renewed buffer stocks could be achieved via continued 
producer subsidies and/or public investment in yield-increasing 
technologies.  The  current  system  sees  the  vast  majority  of 
producer subsidies, over 90%, go to farmers in the United 
States, European Union, and Japan, with a large portion of the 
benefit passed on to consumers in the developing world. Yet 
producer subsidies to farmers in developing countries would 
likely produce much larger productivity gains and alleviate 
poverty, which is the leading cause of chronic food insecurity. 
Comparatively wealthy taxpayers in the United States have 
been subsidizing consumption in the developing world for 
years; perhaps the time has come to think about subsidizing 
developing world production instead.
Public investment in yield-increasing technologies in the 
developing world is badly needed, especially in Africa. Total 
public R&D expenditures in Latin America and Asia and the 
Pacific,  two  regions  that  benefitted  greatly  from  the  green 
revolution of the 1960s and 70s, have increased significantly 
since 2000: China spent $4.3 billion (in 2005 PPP prices) in 
2007; Brazil, with a population of 193 million, spent only 
slightly less than Sub-Saharan Africa, with a population of 
700 million (Beintema and Stads 2011). When public and 
private  R&D  investment  is  combined,  expenditures  in  40 
upper-income countries still dwarf those of the middle- and 
low-income countries combined. The silver lining to the FY 
2011  US  budget  for  food  and  agriculture  aid  is  the  $100 
million marked for the Global Agriculture & Food Security 
Program (GAFSP), a new World Bank-guided initiative aimed 
at  improving  technical  capacity  and  strategic  food  security 
planning in countries in Africa and Asia most threatened by 
widespread hunger.
The  need  to  increase  yields  through  specialization  and 
more  intense  use  of  technology—which,  in  the  short  term, 
would imply greater geographic concentration of production 
in developed countries—must also be weighed against the risks 
posed by climate-related disasters. The 2011 Japan earthquake 
and tsunami raised fears about global supply chains that stem 
from geographic concentration of production, particularly in 
electronics and car parts. If global food production were simi-
larly geographically concentrated, localized flooding, drought, 
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and other natural disasters could significantly threaten global 
food availability. The higher-latitude countries that stand to 
benefit from climate change—at least in terms of agricultural 
productivity and increasing potential cultivable land—cannot 
be the only ones to make gains. And if the rest of the gains from 
technology accrue to middle-income and rapidly developing 
countries like Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, India and China, the 
poverty-alleviating effects of increased production will not reach 
those countries in most desperate need. 
But who will pay? Many middle-income countries appear 
to  be  subsidizing  their  own  technological  advancement, 
and some lower-income countries have instituted producer 
subsidy programs. Sub-Saharan Africa is desperately in need 
of a technology-driven green revolution but lacks either the 
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